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Relative to their share in the population, 
women are less likely to have a science or 
engineering degree and are less likely to be 
employed as scientists or engineers (CEOSE 
2015). For academia there is evidence that 
women are underrepresented at all academic 
levels. For example, even though women earn 
roughly half the doctorates in science and engi-
neering in the United States, they comprise only 
21 percent of full science professors and 5 per-
cent of full engineering professors (Shen 2013). 
There is also evidence that female academics in 
science are less likely to be invited to join corpo-
rate scientific advisory boards (McCook 2013). 
But to our knowledge, there is no evidence that 
the underrepresentation of women in STEM 
occupations persists at higher levels of the cor-
porate hierarchy. We provide such evidence in 
this paper.
Using a comprehensive sample of board data 
for listed firms in 20 countries from 2001–2010, 
we show that the fraction of women on the 
board (Board diversity) is lower for firms in the 
STEM and Finance sectors (STEM&F) than in 
the  non-STEM sector. This finding is robust to 
controlling for firm and country characteristics 
and country and year fixed effects. On average, 
STEM&F firms have 1.8 percent fewer women 
on boards than  non-STEM firms. Relative to the 
sample mean of 7.56 percent, this represents 
an economically significant leadership gap in 
STEM&F fields. Women are most underrepre-
sented on the boards in the natural resources and 
mining; manufacturing; and financial activities 
sectors.
Our results connect two policy debates that 
are usually conducted separately: the debate 
about women’s underrepresentation in STEM 
fields and the debate about women’s under-
representation on corporate boards. The fact 
that women are less represented on corporate 
boards in STEM&F fields suggests that wom-
en’s underrepresentation in STEM occupations 
may get worse at higher levels of the corporate 
hierarchy. Similar to the findings for academic 
positions (Shen 2013), there may be biases or 
impediments to  work-life balance that make it 
harder for women to achieve leadership posi-
tions in STEM&F sectors. This means that 
to solve the underrepresentation problem in 
STEM&F occupations, it may not be enough 
to simply encourage entry of women into these 
fields. More must be done to ensure they do not 
have reasons to exit the industry.
Recognizing that women’s  underrepresentation 
on boards varies by sector is also important for 
the policy movement that aims to increase corpo-
rate board diversity. The EU recently approved 
a draft law that sets an objective of 40 percent 
female nonexecutive directors on boards of 
listed companies across the 28 member states 
of the EU (European Commission 2012). Our 
results suggest that it will be more difficult 
for firms in STEM&F sectors to achieve these 
objectives. It is also plausible that diversity 
will have a greater impact (positive or nega-
tive) on firms in the STEM&F sectors than in 
other sectors. More generally, given that the 
underrepresentation of women on boards in 
STEM&F firms is likely due to the persistent 
underrepresentation of women in STEM&F 
fields, it is unlikely that board diversity targets 
can solve the problems leading to women’s 
underrepresentation on boards in these sectors. 
Policymakers interested in increasing board 
diversity may need to join forces with those who 
worry about the retention of women in STEM 
fields.
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I. Data
Our data is from Adams and Kirchmaier (2015a). Their sample consists of data on 
boards of listed companies in 20 countries for 
the years 2001–2010. Countries in the sample 
are from Europe, the Commonwealth, and the 
United States. Adams and Kirchmaier com-
bine director data from Boardex with financial 
data from CapitalIQ and  country-level data 
from Euromonitor, the OECD family database, 
the World Economic Forum, and the World 
Value Survey, among others. To ensure their 
 country-level coverage is representative, they 
restrict their sample to  country-years in which 
Boardex covers more than 70 percent of total 
market capitalization in that country and year 
and drop countries with low coverage and coun-
tries that are likely to be outliers with respect to 
women on boards. As a result, not all countries 
have ten years of data in the sample.
Adams and Kirchmaier (2015a) drop finan-
cial firms, but we retain them. Our final sam-
ple consists of an unbalanced panel of 44,254 
 firm-year observations on more than 8,000 listed 
firms in 20 countries.
The dataset is complete with respect to gender 
and  non-executive director (NED) and executive 
director (ED) classifications. In countries with a 
dual board system (Austria, Germany, Denmark, 
Netherlands), we classify supervisory board 
members as NEDs and management board mem-
bers as EDs. Board size is the sum of the sizes of 
the supervisory and management boards.
We define STEM industries as industries in 
which a large share of employees are in STEM 
occupations. To determine which industries fall 
into this category, we first obtain a list of occu-
pations that require education in science, tech-
nology, engineering, and mathematics disciplines 
from O*NET (2015). We match these STEM 
occupations to the 2012 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) National Employment Matrix by Industry. 
For each industry, the Employment Matrix indi-
cates the percent of employees from each occu-
pation. We sum the percentages for all STEM 
occupations to obtain the percent of employees 
in STEM occupations in each industry. We then 
average these percentages across industries in 
each of ten industry super sectors as defined by the 
BLS (2015). We define the top five super sectors 
by share of STEM employees as STEM sectors. 
These are: financial activities, with 7.16 percent 
STEM employees on average; natural resources 
and mining (10.75 percent STEM employees); 
manufacturing (15.1 percent STEM employees); 
professional and business services (21.78 percent 
STEM employees); and information (21.8 per-
cent STEM employees).  Non-STEM sectors are: 
leisure and hospitality; trade, transportation, and 
utilities; educational and health services; other 
services; and construction.1
We match the super sector classification to 
our sample firms using NAICS codes from 
CapitalIQ. To highlight that the finance sector is 
 STEM-intensive even though it is not tradition-
ally considered a STEM sector, we label firms 
in the top five STEM sectors as STEM&F firms.
1 Adams and Kirchmaier (2015a, b, and c) provide more 
details on sample characteristics. 
Figure 1. Average Percentage of Women on the Board 
in STEM&F and other Sectors
Notes: Figure 1 shows the average percentage of women on 
the board of more than 8,000 listed firms in 20 countries 
from  2001–2010. The averages are stratified by STEM&F 
(solid line) and other sectors (dashed line). STEM&F sec-
tors are the top five out of ten super sectors ranked according 
to the percentage of employees who are in STEM occupa-
tions. Super sectors are defined using BLS (2015). STEM 
occupations are from O*NET (2015). The  firm-level data is 
from Adams and Kirchmaier (2015a).
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Table 1—Fraction of Women on the Boards of Firms in STEM&F and Other Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
STEM&F −0.018*** −0.018***
[−6.72] [−6.79]
STEM&F − Finance −0.016*** −0.016***
[−4.76] [−4.77]
STEM&F − Information −0.010*** −0.010***
[−2.66] [−2.65]
STEM&F − Manufacturing −0.019*** −0.019***
[−6.71] [−6.66]
STEM&F − Resources −0.041*** −0.043***
[−11.75] [−12.03]
STEM&F − Professional services −0.006 −0.006
[−1.25] [−1.32]
log(Assets) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
[10.01] [10.04] [9.96] [10.01]
Female full-time economic participation  (lagged) 0.370*** 0.317*** −0.185 −0.191
[7.74] [6.55] [−1.54] [−1.57]
Corporate governance code 0.008*** 0.007** 0.011*** 0.011***
[2.89] [2.46] [4.96] [5.18]
Quota for state-owned companies 0.009 0.012 0.057** 0.057**
[0.98] [1.26] [2.10] [2.13]
Gender wage gap 0.523*** 0.525***
[5.31] [5.34]
Codetermination −0.012* −0.008
[−1.83] [−1.31]
Traditional versus secular values 0.015*** 0.012***
[3.60] [3.09]
Survival versus self-expression values 0.004 0.010
[0.44] [1.29]
         
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.123 0.130 0.126 0.134
Adj. R2   0.122 0.129   0.126 0.133
Notes: This table shows regressions of Board diversity on a STEM&F dummy and STEM&F subsector dummies and controls. 
The sample consists of 44,254 firm-year observations in 20 countries in Europe, the Commonwealth, and the United States. All 
regressions include year fixed effects and the following controls which are excluded for the sake of brevity: Fraction of women 
in higher education (lagged), Birth rate (lagged), Tax & social security (lagged), Tenure, Board size, Independence, Family firm, 
GNI/capita (lagged), and ROE. The sample is from Adams and Kirchmaier (2015a). Board diversity measures the number of 
women over Board size. The STEM&F dummy is constructed using data from O*NET (2015) and BLS (2015). Assets is the 
book value of total assets (in billions of USD) for non-US firms converted into USD at market prices at the end of the report-
ing period. Female full-time economic participation is full-time female employment over full-time employment per year and 
country, lagged by ten years. Codetermination is a dummy variable. Gender wage gap is the average gender pay gap score of the 
World Economic Forum for the years available in 2006 to 2010. Traditional versus Secular and Survival versus Self-expression 
measure cultural dimensions and are based on Inglehart and Welzel (2005). Corporate governance code is a dummy indicating 
whether gender balance was explicitly stated in the governance code for that year and country. Quota for state-owned compa-
nies is a dummy variable identifying whether for a given year and country a formal board quota was in place for state-owned 
companies. More variable details are in Adams and Kirchmaier (2015a, b). Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level, with corresponding t-statistics shown in brackets. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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II. Board Diversity in STEM Sectors
In Figure 1 we show the average fraction 
of women on boards over time stratified by 
STEM&F and  non-STEM sectors. Because the 
United States is overrepresented in the sample 
in terms of number of firms, we plot the data 
for  non-US countries and the United States sep-
arately. Boardex has representative coverage for 
the United States starting in 2004, so we plot our 
data from 2004 onwards.
Both panels of Figure 1 show that women 
are less represented on the boards of firms in 
the STEM&F sectors than in other firms. The 
difference between  non-STEM and STEM&F 
firms is greater in the United States, although the 
average fraction of female directors is higher for 
both types of firms in the United States. The fig-
ure also shows that the gap between  non-STEM 
and STEM&F firms does not seem to be narrow-
ing over time.
In Table 1 we examine whether the differ-
ences between  non-STEM and STEM&F firms 
in Figure 1 are driven by differences in firm or 
country characteristics. For example, system-
atic differences in firm size between STEM&F 
and other firms could explain differences in 
their board diversity. Similarly, the occurrence 
of large natural resource sectors in conjunction 
with low gender equality in some countries 
could explain the pattern in Figure 1.
We regress the fraction of women on the 
board (Board diversity) at the firm level on firm 
characteristics such as log(Assets) as a proxy 
for firm size, ROE as a measure of performance, 
Board size, Board Independence, and a Family 
firm dummy. Following Adams and Kirchmaier (2015a), we include amongst others a mea-
sure of female full-time labor force participa-
tion (Female full-time economic participation) 
lagged by ten years, a measure of the gender 
wage gap from the World Economic Forum, 
GNI/Capita, measures of culture (Traditional/
Secular and Survival/ Self-expression) and time 
varying dummies for policies with respect to 
gender (Corporate governance code, Quota for 
 state-owned companies) and Codetermination. 
In columns 1 and 2, we include year fixed 
effects. In columns 3 and 4 we also include 
country fixed effects. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the firm level.
In columns 1 and 3, the primary variable of 
interest is STEM&F, a dummy indicating firms 
are in STEM&F sectors. In columns 2 and 4, 
we disaggregate STEM&F into five sector dum-
mies. The results in columns 1 and 3 show that 
the pattern in Figure 1 is robust to controlling 
for firm and country characteristics. On aver-
age, Board diversity is lower by 1.8 percent in 
STEM&F firms. Diversity is lowest in natural 
resources and mining (by 4.3 percent); manu-
facturing (by 1.9 percent); and financial activi-
ties (by 1.6 percent).
II. Conclusion
The underrepresentation of women in 
STEM&F fields has long-term consequences for 
corporate leadership. An obvious question is: 
Does it matter? It should matter to policymakers 
concerned about women’s underrepresentation 
on boards. It should also matter to policymak-
ers concerned about women’s underrepresen-
tation in STEM fields. It may matter to firms 
in STEM&F sectors. While it is unclear that 
all firms benefit from more boardroom gender 
diversity, clearly some firms will. With the right 
people on the board, diversity can lead to more 
creativity and greater  innovation—important 
characteristics for firms in STEM&F sectors.
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